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Casenotes
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation:
Standing and the Two Million Acre
Question
The United States Supreme Court decision in Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation' illustrates how large amounts of judicial time
and energy may be expended on justiciability issues without ever
reaching the underlying substantive law of a case.2 The Supreme
Court, in granting a motion for summary judgment, concluded that
the National Wildlife Federation [hereinafter NWF] was not a
proper plaintiff to bring the environmental suit because the
organization lacked standing.' In so ruling, the Supreme Court has
no doubt sent a chilling message to future environmental plaintiffs
that, despite prior decisions which might have been interpreted
1. 110 S. CL 3177 (1990). The case was initially filed in the United States District Court,
District of Columbia as National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985).
2. Seven written opinions were generated by this case: Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 110
S. Ct. 3177 (1990); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989); National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 844 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam); National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327
(D.D.C. 1988); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1986); National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985). See note 153 for procedural history of
Lujan. The National Wildlife Federation originally filed suit in July 1985 and the case traveled
through the courts for five years. A number of complex procedural questions were dealt with,
including preliminary injunctions, intervention of parties, joinder of indispensable parties, motions
for dismissal and summary judgment, laches and justiciability issues concerning mootness, ripeness,
and standing.
3. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. CL at 3194. The Supreme Court identified the
essence of the standing question in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975), as "whether the
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues." Id.
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otherwise,4 environmental suits are subject to a rigid application
of the standing requirements.
Prior to Lujan, environmental plaintiffs, evaluating their ability
to meet standing requirements, were encouraged by the Court's
seemingly permissive approach to standing as illustrated in United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP).5 In SCRAP, the Court held that a group of law students
had standing to bring a suit against the Interstate Commerce
Commission based upon the claim that an increase in railroad
freight rates would result in injury to the students' aesthetic and
recreational interests due to the increased exploitation of forests,
mountains and streams within the area.6 SCRAP is considered by
some to be the Supreme Court's most liberal application of the
standing requirement because of the tenuous chain of causation.7
However, in Lujan, the Supreme Court, speaking with four new
justices since the 1973 SCRAP decision, refused to find that an
environmental group had standing to enjoin the Bureau of Land
Management [hereinafter BLM] from reclassifying certain federal
lands to allow for mining activities!
The standing problem presented in Lujan involved an unusually
complex factual setting. The plaintiff, NWF, asserted standing to
4. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. 1
(1980) (interpreting Clean Water Act § 505 as adopting the Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972), standing requirements, despite more restrictive interpretations of standing in the interim);
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973)
(recognizing that injury-in-fact may consist solely of harm to aesthetic well-being); Sierra Club, infra
(an organization has standing to bring an action as a representative of members who would
themselves have standing).
5. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
6. Id. at 686-90. See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holding
of SCRAP).
7. K.C. DAvis, ADMINISMTRATVE LAW TREATsE 322 (1983).
8. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3181 (1990). The 1973 Court, which
decided SCRAP, was comprised as follows: The majority, deciding in favor of the plaintiffs' standing,
were Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Douglas, Marshall and Stewart. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 669.
Dissenting to the portion of the opinion allowing the plaintiffs' standing were Chief Justice Burger
and Justices White and Rehnquist. Id. Justice Powell took no part in the decision of the case. Id. The
1990 Court which decided Lujan had the following composition: The majority, deciding against the
plaintiffs' standing, were Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, White and Sealia.
Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3181. Dissenting to the opinion were Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Stevens, and
Marshall. Id.
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challenge over 1,250 individual decisions of the BLM which
affected over 180,000,000 acres of public land.' The NWF based
its assertion of standing primarily upon a single member's claim of
recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment "in the vicinity" of a
2,000,000 acre parcel, which contained 4,500 acres specifically
affected by a BLM decision."0
The Lujan decision is evidence of the new direction the
Supreme Court will now take in evaluating a plaintiff's standing in
environmental cases." Lujan indicates that SCRAP was a
highwater mark for standing to which the Court will not soon
return." Arguably, Lujan has changed standing requirements in
environmental cases by dictating that to obtain judicial review the
plaintiff must not only be injured, but the location at which the
injury is claimed must correspond to the location of the act which
is the subject of the complaint. 3 Alternatively, the Court's
decision in Lujan may be explained by the argument that the
affidavits supporting the plaintiffs' standing in Lujan were not
specific enough in stating how the plaintiffs were injured by the
actions of the defendants.' 4 Finally, the majority and dissenting
opinions in Lujan present two different views within the Court for
determining whether a plaintiff has made a sufficient showing to
survive a motion for summary judgment.' 5
Part I of this Note reviews the legal background of the standing
doctrine, detailing the constitutional and prudential requirements,
9. Brief for Petitioners at 11, 15, Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990) (No.
89-640).
10. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187-88. The Court of Appeals based its finding of NWF's standing
upon one affidavit. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422, 431 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
11. See, e.g., Student Pub. Int. Res. Group v. P.D. Oil & Chem., 913 F.2d 64, 84 (3d Cir.
1990) (Aldisert, J., concurring) (viewing Lujan as an indication that the Supreme Court is not
relaxing standing requirements in environmental cases).
12. See infra notes 54-60 and 257-272 and accompanying text (discussing the expansive
standing approach allowed in SCRAP).
13. See infra notes 246-256 and accompanying text (presenting argument that Lujan has
changed the requirements for injury-in-fact).
14. See infra notes 246-256 and accompanying text (presenting argument that Lujan did not
change the injury-in-fact requirement).
15. See infra notes 234-245 and accompanying text (comparing the majority's strict adherence
to facts explicitly stated within the record and the willingness of the dissent to make inferences "'in
light or' the record as a whole).
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legislative provisions, and procedural considerations in applying the
doctrine of standing. 6 Part II reviews the legal background of the
Federal Land Policy Management Act, the substantive law involved
in Lujan."7 Part III summarizes the facts of Lujan and reviews the
majority and dissenting opinions of that decision."3 Finally, Part
PV of this Note discusses the possible legal ramifications that the
Lujan decision will have in determining whether a plaintiff has
standing for judicial review, particularly for bringing an
environmental action.19
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND To STANDING
A. Justiciability Doctrines
The power of federal courts to hear and review cases is limited
by the various justiciability doctrines which include ripeness,
mootness, political question, and standing.2" These doctrines serve
several purposes.21 First, because the justiciability requirement
limits the power of the judiciary in reviewing legislative and
executive actions, the doctrines implement the constitutional
requirement of separation of powers by confining the scope of
judicial review.' Second, the doctrines conserve judicial resources
by allowing the courts to dismiss cases which do not meet the
justiciability criteria.' The justiciability doctrines are also
intended to limit cases before the court to those in which adverse
litigants with a stake in the outcome of the litigation are presenting
a concrete controversy, appropriate for judicial review.24 Finally,
the justiciability doctrines are designed to promote fairness,
16. See infra notes 20-139 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 140-152 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 153-233 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 234-272 and accompanying text.
20. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-97 (1968).
21. See generally E. CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, 37-145 (1989).
22. Id. at 39.
23. Id. As an example, mootness conserves judicial resources by allowing courts to dismiss
a case where there is no longer a live controversy. Id.
24. Id at 40.
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particularly in cases where judicial review of a matter results in the
adjudication of the rights of someone who is not a party to the
lawsuit.25
B. Constitutional Requirements for Standing
Article Ill of the United States Constitution limits the federal
judicial power to cases or controversies arising under the
Constitution and the laws and treaties of the United States.26 The
Supreme Court has interpreted the case-or-controversy requirement
to mean that a plaintiff can only invoke the jurisdiction of a federal
court when the plaintiff has standing to bring the action.'
Standing addresses the question of whether a specific person is the
proper party to bring a particular matter before the court for
adjudication.' The standing requirement insures that the
adjudication is necessary and there is a concrete dispute between
the parties so that the issue is vigorously litigated.29 If
adjudication of the issue is unnecessary, the result is an advisory
opinion which is prohibited by article M11.3" If the plaintiff's
standing is at issue, a federal court may not exercise its power to
decide the case on the merits unless the plaintiff alleges facts
sufficient to show the existence of personal stake in the results of
the litigation.'
The test for determining whether a plaintiff meets the minimum
constitutional requirements for standing was articulated by the
Supreme Court in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State. 2 Valley Forge
identifies three minimum requirements of Constitutional standing
which the plaintiff must allege as a minimum to obtain judicial
25. Id.
26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cL 1.
27. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975).
28. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1983).
29. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1976).
30. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1968).
31. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976).
32. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
227
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review.3 A plaintiff must allege that the plaintiff has either
suffered or is imminently threatened with suffering an injury, which
is referred to as the injury-in-fact requirement.' In addition, the
injury suffered must be traceable to the conduct of the defendant




The injury-in-fact analysis requires the plaintiff to demonstrate
an actual or threatened injury from the action being challenged.36
An injury-in-fact exists when the injury or threat of injury is real
and immediate rather than based upon conjecture or hypothesis. 7
The most indisputable type of injury constituting an injury-in-fact
is where the plaintiff has suffered an economic loss or personal
injury as the result of a breach of contract or tort.38 The problem
of ascertaining whether there has been a cognizable injury
sufficient for standing increases in complexity as the injury
becomes more abstract. 39 An abstract injury is one which is so
broad and general that it affects the whole public as opposed to
being a distinct and palpable injury to a limited class of
plaintiffs.
40
33. Id. at 472. The Court expressed the test as follows:
[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. I requires the party who invokes the court's
authority to "show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant," ... and that the injury "fairly
can be traced to the challenged action" and "is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision."
Id (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) and Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)).
34. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.
35. Id.
36. Id. See generally K. Wardzinski, The Doctrine of Standing: Barriers to Judicial Review
in the D.C. Circuit, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, 7 (Fall 1990) (discussing the constitutional standing
analysis).
37. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983).
38. WARDZINSKI, supra note 36, at 7.
39. DAvis, supra note 7, at 240.
40. DAvis, supra note 7, at 245. Professor Davis gives several examples of abstract injury
which provide no basis for standing, such as challenging the waging of the Vietnam War, failure of
the government to control inflation, or the Senate's failure to ratify a nuclear arms treaty. Id.
228
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The magnitude of the injury is not determinative of whether it
constitutes an injury-in-fact sufficient for standing.4 The Court
uses the injury requirement as a bright line test for standing.42 The
Court will not analyze various gradations of injury to determine
whether the harm alleged by the plaintiff is substantial enough to
establish injury-in-fact, but rather draws a line between injury and
no injury.
43
In Sierra Club v. Morton,' the Court rejected the idea that a
plaintiff has standing for judicial review based merely upon the
plaintiff's interest in the subject matter of the litigation without the
plaintiff being among the injured.4' However, the Court
recognized in Sierra Club that the meaning of injury-in-fact
includes harm to aesthetic well being.46 The plaintiff organization
in Sierra Club sued the United States Forest Service regarding its
approval of a proposal to construct a private recreational area in the
Sequoia National Forest.47 The Sierra Club argued that its
longstanding concern in environmental matters was sufficient for
the court to confer standing, and therefore it was not necessary for
the organization itself, or any of its members, to allege a specific
injury.
48
While acknowledging that its earlier opinions had broadened
the meaning of injury to include widely shared noneconomic
harm,49 the Court in Sierra Club stiffly refused to discard the
requirement that the party seeking judicial review must have
suffered an actual injury." The injury-in-fact test, wrote the
Court, is only met when there is harm to a cognizable interest and
the party seeking judicial review is among those injured.5 If no
41. Id. at 240-41.
42. Id. at 241.
43. Id.
44. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
45. Id. at 734-35.
46. Id. at 734.
47. Id. at 729-30.
48. Id. at 735-36.
49. See, e.g., Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1969) ("[S]tanding may
stem from ... [noneconomic values] ... as well as from... economic injury.-).
50. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 738.
51. Id. at 734-35.
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injury were required, judicial review would be available to any
organization or individual interested in promoting their own values
through the judicial process.' 2 Therefore, despite the Sierra Club's
history of commitment and interest in the subject matter of the
controversy, the Court recognized the injury-in-fact requirement as
a bright line test which must be met to establish standing.'3
One year later, in United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),'4 the Court held that a
plaintiff has standing to bring an action where the plaintiff's
alleged injury is to aesthetic and recreational interests. 5 The
plaintiffs alleged that a surcharge on interstate railroad freight
shipments would discourage the use of recycled materials and
thereby inflict aesthetic and recreational harm on them because the
local mountains, forests, rivers and streams used by the members
for recreational purposes would be adversely affected by expanded
resource extraction and by littering.
56
The SCRAP decision probably represents the highwater mark
for liberality by the Court in finding standing.' 7 The Court
assessed the causal link between the complained of act and the
alleged injury as not far removed from "an ingenious academic
52. Id. at 740.
53. Id. at 740-41. In the book, Tm BRtMintaN, the authors quote Justice White, beforejoining
the majority, as saying, "Why didn't the Sierra Club have one goddamn member walk through the
park and then there would have been standing to sue?" B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONa, Tim
BREnti 192 (1981).
54. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
55. Id. at 690. Various environmental groups brought the action, including Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) and the Environmental Defense Fund. SCRAP
described itself in its amended complaint as "an unincorporated association formed by five law
students.... Its primary purpose is to enhance the quality of the human environment for its
members, and for all citizens." Id. at 678.
56. Id. at 678. The complaint alleged that each of the SCRAP members used "the forests,
rivers, streams, mountains and other natural resources surrounding the Washington metropolitan area
and at his legal residence, for camping, hiking, fishing, sightseeing, and other recreational [and]
aesthetic purposes." Id. The plaintiffs also alleged economic harm from an increase in prices for
finisled products. Id. The Court stated in a footnote that because the environmental interest the
plaintiffs were seeking to protect was within the interests to be protected by the National
Environmental Protection Act, they had standing under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act and
it was therefore unnecessary to consider whether the plaintiffs' allegations of economic harm were
sufficient to confer standing. Id. at 686, n.13.
57. DAVIS, supra note 7, at 322.
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exercise in the conceivable." 58 Nonetheless, as alleged in the
pleadings, the potential impact of environmental damage to the
plaintiffs' recreational and aesthetic interests was sufficiently
specific and perceptible for the plaintiffs to obtain judicial
review." As further evidence of its willingness to open the
courthouse doors to environmental plaintiffs, the SCRAP Court
expressly acknowledged that the harm necessary for a court to find
sufficient injury-in-fact might be an "identifiable trifle."'
2. Traceability and Redressability - The Causation Elements
Even where the plaintiff shows injury-in-fact, a court cannot
find that a plaintiff has standing to bring the action unless the
injury is traceable to the conduct of the defendant and a favorable
decision by the court will result in the harm being redressed.6'
Until recently, traceability and redressability were analyzed by the
Court as a single causation component.62 Traceability requires that
the line of causation between the alleged illegal conduct and the
plaintiff's injury not be too attenuated for the court to grant
review."' The redressability question examines whether it is too
speculative that a favorable ruling from the court will result in
58. SCRAP at 688. The Court suggested that the defendants should have moved for summary
judgment on the standing issue if the plaintiffs' allegations of the causal links were untrue. Id. at 689.
59. Id. at 689-90.
60. Id. at 689, n.14 (quoting K.C. Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L REv.
601, 613).
61. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
62. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753, n.19 (1984). That footnote says in part:
The "fairly traceable" and "redressability" components of the constitutional standing
inquiry were initially articulated by this Court as "two facets of a single causation
requirement.". . . To the extent there is a difference, it is that the former examines the
causal connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged injury, whereas
the latter examines the causal connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief
requested.
Id. The question regarding whether traceability and redressability are separate independent elements
or "facets" of causation perhaps arose from Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), where the Court
referred to the requirement that the plaintiffs show that "the asserted injury was the consequence of
the defendants' actions, or that prospective relief will remove the harm." Warth, 422 U.S. at 505.
63. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751-52.
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relieving the plaintiff's injury.' As with injury-in-fact, the
traceability and redressability requirements prevent federal courts
from issuing advisory opinions.' Thus, a plaintiff who is clearly
injured can be denied standing for judicial review if he fails to
allege that the defendant caused his injury or fails to allege that a
favorable decision by the court will provide a remedy for his
injury.'
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization67
illustrates that a complaint which fails to specifically indicate how
the alleged injury was caused by the defendants' actions is
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss." The plaintiffs were a group
of low income individuals who brought suit against the Secretary
of the Treasury and the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue
Service.69 The plaintiffs alleged that by granting favorable tax
64. Id. at 752. Redressability in environmental cases has been found if the defendant is
capable of paying civil penalties. Sierra Club v. Simkins, Inc., 847 F.2d 1109, 1113 (4th Cir. 1988).
In Simkins, a suit brought pursuant to the Citizen Suit Provision of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
1365, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the imposition of civil penalties, payable
to the United States Treasury, sufficiently redressed the private plaintiff's harm from the defendant's
wrongful act of failing to submit monitoring reports to a federal agency. Id. "[Tihe judicial relief of
civil penalties, even if payable only to the United States Treasury, is causally connected to a citizen-
plaintiff's injury. Such penalties can be an important deterrence against future violations." Id. Under
this view, the third prong of standing under Valley Forge, redressability, presumably will always be
met in actions under the Clean Water Act if the defendant is capable of paying civil penalties.
65. CHEMERhNsKY, supra note 21, at 66.
66. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
67. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
68. Simon, 426 U.S. at 41, 46. Other notable examples of application of the causation
requirement are Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1972), and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975). In Linda R.S., the mother of an illegitimate child, representing a class of such plaintiffs,
challenged a Texas statute which imposed criminal sanctions for a marital father's failure to make
child support payments but which did not impose such a penalty when the child had been born out
of wedlock. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 614-16. The Court concluded that the class of mothers had no
standing because their injury, nonsupport for their children, was not the direct result of a failure to
proszcute. Id. at 618-19. The Court also found that the requested relief would only result in the
jailing of the father and would not serve to redress the injury. Ma at 618. In Warth, the Court denied
standing to a group of low-income minority plaintiffs who were seeking to reside in a suburb which
had enacted zoning ordinances claimed to be unconstitutional by the plaintiffs. Warth, 422 U.S. at
507-08. The Court denied standing on the basis of plaintiffs' failure to show causation because the
plaintiffs didn't show that, but for the zoning ordinances, low cost housing would be built which the
plaintiffs could afford to purchase. Id. at 506-07. Professor Chemerinsky states that Linda RS., Warth
and Simon "illustrate that the causation-redressability standing requirement is a powerful barrier to
federal court review." CHEMSRINsKY, supra note 21, at 66.
69. Simon, 426 U.S. at 32-33.
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treatment to hospitals which refused to offer full services to
indigents, the defendants were encouraging those hospitals to deny
services to the plaintiffs.7' Although the plaintiffs alleged specific
instances on which they had been denied hospital services because
of their indigence, and thereby suffered injury, the Court denied the
plaintiffs standing because no hospital had been named as a
defendant.71 The Court found the connection between the action
challenged by the plaintiffs, the adoption of the revenue ruling, and
the plaintiffs' physical injuries to be too attenuated.72 It was
purely speculative, said the Court, whether the plaintiffs' injury
was the result of the defendants' act or of an independent action of
a third party not before the court.73
The Court also found that it was unclear whether the relief
requested by the plaintiffs would redress the alleged injury.74 The
plaintiffs sought declaratory judgments that the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service
had violated the Internal Revenue Code and that a hospital's
charitable tax treatment required that the hospital provide full
services to persons unable to pay.75 However, hospitals could elect
to not provide services to indigents and thereby reject the favorable
tax treatment in order to avoid the undetermined financial drain of
providing uncompensated services.76 In that event, the declaratory
judgments sought by the plaintiffs would fail to redress their injury
of being denied full medical services at the hospitals.' The Court,
therefore, held that the plaintiffs did not have standing for judicial
review because even though the plaintiffs had alleged injury-in-fact,
70. Id. at 33.
71. Id. at 41.
72. Id. at 40-41.
73. Id. at 42-43.
74. Id. at 43.
75. Id. at 34 n.10.
76. Id. at 43.
77. Id.
233
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they had failed to establish the other elements of constitutional
standing--traceability and redressability. 78
While the requirements of showing injury-in-fact, traceability,
and redressability must be met for a court to confer standing, the
court does not have to confer standing if the three elements are
established. A federal court may also impose certain
nonconstitutional barriers to judicial review based upon reasons of
prudence.79
C. Prudential Requirements
In addition to the three constitutional standing elements
expressed in Valley Forge, the Court has articulated "prudential"
limitations to its exercise of jurisdiction."' The Court, in Allen v.
Wight, identified three additional limitations to the exercise of
jurisdiction, which it collectively labeled the prudential
component.8 ' First, federal courts may not adjudicate a case where
a plaintiff is raising the rights of a third party."2 Second, a
plaintiff will be denied standing if he is raising a generalized
grievance universally shared by the public, since the political
78. Id. at 46. The plaintiffs cited United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973), as support for their standing to bring this action. Simon,
426 U.S. at 45, n.25. The Court, in a footnote, distinguished SCRAP saying that even though that
case involved an "attenuated line of causation," the plaintiffs had "nevertheless alleged a specific
and perceptible harm" which was traceable to the questioned agency action. Id. "But in this case the
complaint is insufficient even to survive a motion to dismiss, for it fails to allege an injury that fairly
can be traced to petitioners' challenged action." Id.
79. CHEMERPNSKY, supra note 21, at 71-72.
80. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
81. Id
82. Id. at 751. But see DAvIs, supra note 7, at 260-67. Professor Davis discusses 17 cases in
which the Supreme Court found standing where a party was asserting the rights of another. Id. Four
additional cases are referenced in which the Court has said that one may not assert the rights of
others: Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans Unitedfor Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982); Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979); Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,429 U.S. 252,263 (1977); and Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 509 (1975). DAvis, supra note 7 at 260-67.
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process is designed to address such problems.3 3 Finally, the
plaintiff will not have standing if his complaint falls outside of the
protection, or the "zone of interests," of the law he is invoking. 4
The purposes of the prudential requirements parallel the
objectives of the constitutional standing requirements. The
restriction against third party standing, also referred to as jus tertii
standing, improves the quality of litigation because the third party,
whose rights are being raised, is usually the best proponent of his
rights. 5 The barrier against parties asserting a generalized
grievance is founded upon the grounds of separation of powers.86
Limiting the role of the judiciary to preventing and remedying
specific injuries prevents encroachment into the political branches
of the government.' The zone of interests standard requires that
those who claim standing by invoking the protection of a statute
should be the ones the legislature intended to protect by its
enactment.8"
The prudential standing requirements have the effect of barring
judicial review in cases where the requirements for constitutional
standing have otherwise been met.89 However, Congress may
grant express rights of action by statute which enable parties to
overcome any of the prudential standing requirements so that the
83. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. See also CHEmENSKY, supra note 21 at 78. The author describes
a generalized grievance as one where plaintiffs sue solely as concerned citizens to compel the
government to follow the law or as taxpayers desiring to restrain allegedly illegal governmental
expenditures. Id. The existence of a generalized grievance is not determined from the number of
people affected by the challenged action. Id.
84. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. The "zone of interests" requirement was first articulated by the
Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970). The Court found in that case that a person seeking agency review under the Administrative
Procedure Act had standing if he had suffered an injury and "the zone of interests to be protected
by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute
or constitutional guarantee in question." Id. at 153. See generally, DAVIS, supra note 7, at 273-80
(criticism of the test for, among other reasons, being applied inconsistently by the Court and for
lacking clarity).
85. CH B RNsKY, supra note 21, at 72.
86. Id. at 83.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 86.
89. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
454 U.S. 464,475 (1982).
235
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
plaintiff need only meet the requirements of constitutional standing
to bring the action.9°
A different issue is whether Congress may declare the existence
of an injury by statute which was not legally cognizable prior to
the statutory enactment.91 For example, in the context of Sierra
Club v. Morton, could Congress, without violating the injury-in-fact
requirement of article Ill, enact a statute which declares that the
Sierra Club suffers an injury-in-fact whenever there is harm to the
environment?' The Court has not given a clear answer to this
question.93
D. Legislative Provisions for Standing
Congress has provided two general means of conferring
standing through statutes. 94 First is a general provision for
standing contained within the Administrative Procedure Act
90. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
91. See, e.g.,Trafficante v. MetropolitanLife Insurance Co.,409U.S. 205,212(1972) (White,
J., concurring) (plaintiff's constitutional standing was extended by the Civil Rights Act of 1968).
92. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text (discussing the Sierra Club's argument for
standing in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)).
93. Discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally P. BATOR, D.
MELrZER, P. MISHKIN & D. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDEAL. SYsTM, 135 (3rd. ed. 1988). After acknowledging that Congress may presumably confer
standing by legislation where it would otherwise be barred by prudential standing limitations, the
authors state: "The problem is thornier if Congress purports to confer standing in a case in which,
absent such legislation, the Court would fimd no injury under article III. The Court's discussion of
this question has not been a model of clarity." Id. Compare Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,
617 n.3 (1973) ("Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.") and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 500-01 (1975) ("The actual or threatened injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue
of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing."') with Havens Realty Corp.
v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982) ("[The sole requirement for standing to sue under [the Act]
is the Art. III minima of injury in fact: that the plaintiff allege that as a result of the defendant's
actions he has suffered a 'distinct and palpable injury."'). For an argument that the plaintiff need not
show a "distinct and palpable injury" when standing has been granted by statute, see G. Nichol,
Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REv. 68, 84-85 (1984).
94. Statutory standing has been said to be but one of three sources of legal cognizable
interests, harm to which may qualify as injury for judicial review. NiCIloL, supra note 93 at 83. The
other two sources are constitutional guarantees against the injury and injuries which are protected
against by the common law. For an argument that the injury-in-fact requirement should only apply
to the last of these sources as opposed to operating as an overriding standing requirement see
NictioL, supra note 93, at 83.
236
1991 / Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation
[hereinafter APA] where a plaintiff who meets the requirements of
the statute may challenge the actions of an agency of the federal
government.95 The APA provides a means of circumventing the
sovereign immunity limitations against suing the federal
government.96
The second type of statutory standing is where a statute
contains within its provisions an express right of action to enforce
the substantive portions of the statute. These types of provisions are
generally broader than the APA standing provisions in that they
provide standing for judicial review of not only the actions of the
agency responsible for enforcement of the statute but also for
parties to act as private attorney generals97 to sue private violators
of the acts.98 For example, environmental statutes commonly
provide for private citizens to sue both governmental agencies and
private parties to enforce compliance with the statutes.99 The
intent of the citizen suit provisions is to empower private citizens
to enforce the statutory rights of the community at large, where in
the past only the government itself had standing to bring the
actions."0 0
95. Section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1989). The APA, in
another section, authorizes judicial review of agency action except in cases where the pertinent statute
precludes such review. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1989).
96. See CHEERINSKY, supra note 21, at 473. See also Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer,
424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (sovereign immunity has no application in cases where the
Administrative Procedure Act is applicable).
97. The concept of "private attorney general" allows a private party plaintiff to pursue an
action on behalf of the public if the plaintiff is advancing policies inherent in public interest
legislation. BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY, 129 (6th. ed. 1990).
98. See infra notes 109-125 and accompanying text (discussing private enforcement of
environmental statutes). Although a citizen may bring a suit acting as a private attorney general, the
injury requirement still exists. In Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1 (198 1),
the Court stated that lilt is clear that the citizen-suit provisions apply only to persons who can claim
some sort of injury .... [t]his broad category of potential plaintiffs necessarily includes... plaintiffs
seeking to enforce these statutes as private attorneys general, whose injuries are 'noneconomic.' Id.
at 16-17.
99. See infra notes 109-125 and accompanying text (discussing the various environmental
statutes containing provisions for citizen-suit enforcement).
100. J. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL
LAws, 1 (1987) (detailing the history and intent of environmental citizen suit provisions).
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1. Standing to Challenge Agency Action
The Administrative Procedure Act, section 10(a), 5 U.S.C.
section 702, [hereinafter section 702] provides that "[a] person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action,101 or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."' 2  The
section incorporates the requirement that the plaintiff allege facts
sufficient to show the existence of the three constitutional standing
elements of injury-in-fact, traceability, and redressability"' In
addition, the Court has interpreted section 702 to require that the
prudential zone of interests test be met as well.'04 The
requirement that the injury be within the "zone of interests" of a
statute is implicitly codified within section 702 by requiring that
the "adverse effect" or "aggrievement" suffered by the plaintiff
be "within the meaning of a relevant statute," i.e., be the interests
the legislature intended to protect in enacting the statute."0 5 This
101. A reviewable agency action under § 702 is the issuance or denial of any rule, order,
license or an equivalent action by an agency of the federal government. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1989).
102. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1989). Professor Davis says in his treatise that the crucial question about
§ 702 is "whether the words 'within the meaning of a relevant statute' modify only the words
.aggrieved by agency action' or whether they also modify the words 'adversely affected."' DAVIS,
supra note 7, at 216-17 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1989)). He cites the legislative history of the
section and statements by the Senate and House Committees to interpret the statute to more
accurately read "'any person affected in fact by agency action' is entitled to review, and that 'any
person... aggrieved within the meaning of any statute* is entitled to review." Id.
103. See supra notes 36-79 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional elements of
standing). The Court has said that the "injury-in-fact" constitutional requirement is incorporated
within the statutory requirement of § 702 that a party be "adversely affected" or "aggrieved" in
order for a federal court to recognize standing in cases challenging the actions of federal agencies.
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689,
n.14 (1973). In Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976), the Court said that
the constitutional standing requirement under § 710 was that the plaintiff make allegations, which,
if true, would establish that the plaintiff had been injured in fact by the action he sought to have
reviewed, which therefore establishes the causation requirement. Id. at 38-39. At the time of Simon,
both traceability and redressability were treated as a single causation component and the Court hadn't
clarified that traceability and redressability were separate independent elements. See CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 21, at 64.
104. Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1969).
105. Id. See generally DAvis, supra note 7, at 214-19 (discussing whether the phrase
"adversely affected" is qualified by the later words in the statute of "within the meaning of a
relevant statute."). Davis contends that the APA should be construed to extend standing to any
person suffering "injury in fact" as a result of agency action on the grounds that they are "adversely
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element is established when the party invoking the protection of a
statute shows that the legislature intended for that party to be
included among those protected by the statute.I°6
Section 702 was enacted in 1946, and the first provision for
citizen suits within an environmental statute was within the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1970.1°7 Therefore, prior to 1970, section
702 was the only means of gaining access to federal courts by
citizens challenging agency action regarding environmental issues.
Even with the advent of citizen suit provisions,, section 702
continues to be widely used because many of the substantive
statutes alleged to be violated by the governmental agency contain
no citizen suit provisions."0 8
2. Standing to Enforce Environmental Acts
Twelve of the major environmental acts contain provisions for
citizen suit" enforcement."' 0 The Clean Air Act amendments
of 1970 introduced the citizen suit as an enforcement mechanism
affected" within the meaning of the statute. Id at 219.
106. CHEMER1NSKY, supra note 21, at 86.
107. Section 304 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604. See generally J. Munm, supra note 100, at
3-6 (providing history of citizen suits in environmental statutes).
108. See, e.g., Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Federation, 110 S. CL 3177, 3182 (1990) (alleging
violations of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1783 (1982),
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982), and the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982)); United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 679 (1973) (alleging violations of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. § 4332); and Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 730 (1972) (alleging violations of 16 U.S.C. §§ 1, 41, 43, 45c, & 497).
109. Provisions for citizen suits within congressional acts empower citizens, who have an
interest which has been adversely affected, to obtain federal judicial review to enforce the substantive
portions of the act. J. M t, supra note 100, at 4. The involvement of the citizenry supplements
the government's enforcement resources and also induces the government to act. Id.
110. Toxic Substances Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1988); Endangered Species Act
§ 1l(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act § 520,30 U.S.C.
§ 1270 (1988); Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act § 105(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1988); Deepwater Ports Act § 16,33 U.S.C. § 1515
(1988); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449,42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Noise Control
Act § 12, 42 U.S.C. 4911 (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C. §
6972 (1988); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988); Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act § 310,42 U.S.C. 9659 (1988); and Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act § 23, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (1988).
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with the inclusion of section 304."' Afterwards, citizen suit
provisions were routinely included in new federal environmental
statutes and in the major amendments of existing statutes."' The
purpose of these provisions was to provide a private alternative to
government enforcement of environmental legislation.
1 13
The citizen-suit provisions are very similar and are modeled
after section 304 of the Clean Air Act. 4 Each provides that
"any person" 5 may initiate a suit to enforce compliance with
the particular act or to require the government to perform a duty
mandated by the act. 16 The provisions allow citizens to bring
these suits where in the past only the government could enforce the
statutes. 7 The citizen suit provisions also allow citizens to sue
the administrator of an agency for the administrator's failure to
perform discretionary duties under an Act, and in this sense the
provisions for citizen suits operate in the same manner as section
Ill. . MULA R, supra note 100, at 4.
112. l at 5.-6.
113. Id. at 4.
114. Id. at 7.
115. Section 505 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988), refers to "citizen"
instead of "person." However, § 505(g) defines citizen as "a person or persons having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected." Id. Section 505 was adopted by Congress on October 18,
1972, almost exactly six months after the Supreme Court decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972). An existing House bill, H.R. 11896, was drafted prior to release of the Sierra Club
opinion and severely restricted the citizen suit provision by limiting "the right to bring actions to
persons directly affected by a violation of the proposed Act or to groups who have participated in
the administrative proceedings of a case." S. Conf. Rep. No. 1236,92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 146 (1972),
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3776,3823, and in 1 Senate Comm. on Public
Works, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Arendments
of 1972, at 281,329 (1973) [hereinafter Legislative History]. However, this restrictive language was
abandoned in favor of language which defined a citizen as "a person or persons having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected." Legislative History, supra, at 249-50. This language was
based upon § 10(a) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702. The conferees expressly stated that the interpretation
given to § 702 by the Court in Sierra Club was also that to be given to the standing provision of §
505 of the Clean Water Act. Legislative History, supra, at 249-50. It is not clear that the citizen suit
provisions of the other environmental statutes should be governed by Sierra Club, because Congress
made no reference to the Sierra Club standard when the other statutes were enacted. J. MI.ER, supra
note 100, at 23.
116. J. MIrLER, supra note 100, at 7.
117. Id. at 3-4.
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702."' These sections confer jurisdiction on federal district courts
to adjudicate the citizen suits without regard to diversity of
citizenship or amount in controversy." 9 However, the plaintiffs
still must have constitutional standing to bring the action and, at a
minimum, must show the three required elements of Valley Forge:
injury-in-fact, traceability, and redressability.'2 ° There are several
advantages to bringing a suit pursuant to a specific citizen action
provision as opposed to section 702. Some of the more
contemporary provisions have been interpreted to confer standing
to the limit of the Constitution, 2' whereas section 702 imposes
the additional prudential "zone of interests" requirement."n In
addition, some of the statutes provide for an award of attorney
fees. 12 3
118. See § 505(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1988) (allowing direct
citizen actions against violators of the Act) and § 505(a)(2) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1988)
(allowing citizens to sue the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency for failing to
perform his nondiscretionary duties under the Act).
119. MILLER, supra note 100, at 7.
120. See, e.g., Student Pub. Int. Res. Group v. P.D. Oil & Chemical, 913 F.2d 64,70 (3d Cir.
1990) (court applied only the Valley Forge test, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982), to confer standing on
citizen group bringing suit pursuant to citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1365); Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035,1039 (8th Cir. 1988) (in suit brought pursuant
to the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g), the court held that
the plaintiffs need only establish the constitutional requirements for standing summarized in Valley
Forge); Sierra Club v. Simpkins, Inc., 847 F.2d 1109,1113 (4th Cir. 1988) (court stated, in analyzing
standing of citizen group bringing citizen suit under the Clean Water Act, "[o]f course, Congress'
provision for citizen suits does not, in itself, establish article III standing ... " and proceeded to
analyze standing only under Valley Forge elements).
121. See, e.g., Student Pub. Int. Res. Group v. P.D. Oil & Chem., 913 F.2d 64, 70 n.3
(reviewing whether an environmental organization had standing to bring a suit pursuant to § 505 of
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)). The court said: "In addition to constitutional
considerations, there are prudential limitations that may lead a court to deny standing. In this case,
we need not consider such prudential limitations since the Act explicitly confers standing to the limits
of the constitution." Id. The court went on to evaluate standing under the three elements of Valley
Forge. Id.
122. Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1969).
123. Toxic Substances Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c) (1988); Endangered Species Act
§ 11(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act § 520,30 U.S.C.
§ 1270(0 (1988); Clean Water Act § 505,33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1988); Marine Protection, Research,
and Sanctuaries Act § 105(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (1988); Deepwater Ports Act § 16, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1515(d) (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449,42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987);
Noise Control Act § 12, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act §
7002,42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1988); Clean Air Act § 304,42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1988); Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(0 (1988); and
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Each of the provisions for citizen suits under the environmental
statutes imposes certain procedural requirements for the filing of
such actions. Most require that prior to commencing an action
against a violator of an environmental statute, the private citizen
must give 60 days notice to the agency, the state in which the
alleged violation occurs, and to the alleged violator.' 24 A citizen
may not sue under most of the statutes if the government has
commenced and is prosecuting a violator of the act."25 In addition
to these procedural requirements for filing an action under a
citizen-suit provision of an environmental statute, the procedural
setting of any case where standing is at issue can be determinative
of the outcome upon appeal.
E. Procedural Considerations of Standing
If a plaintiff lacks constitutional standing, a federal court does
not have jurisdiction to review the action.12 If there is a question
of the plaintiff's standing upon the face of the complaint, the
defendant may move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure [hereinafter Fed. R. Civ. P.] 12(b)(1) or
12(b)(6).1 27 If the defendant fails to raise the standing defense,
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 23, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (1988).
124. Toxic Substances Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(b) (1988); Endangered Species Act
§ 11(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act § 520,30 U.S.C.
§ 1270(b) (1988); Clean Water Act § 505,33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1988); Marine Protection, Research,
and Sanctuaries Act § 105(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1988); Deepwater Ports Act § 16, 33 U.S.C. §
1515(b) (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449,42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987);
Noise Control Act § 12, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(b) (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act §
7002,42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (1988); Clean Air Act § 304,42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1988); Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d) (1988); and
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 23, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (1988).
125. See supra note 124 (listing the applicable statutes).
126. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 197 (1956). But see DAVIS, supra
note 7, at 294-98 (arguing that in numerous cases the Court has assumed standing to reach the merit:
rather than deciding standing first to establish jurisdiction).
127. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (providing that defenses of "lack ofjurisdiction
over the subject matter" and "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" may be
made by motion in response to the complaint).
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the court may do so on its own motion at any time. 128 If the
court concludes that the plaintiff lacks standing, the court must
dismiss the action." 9 In making its decision on a motion to
dismiss, the court is to accept all of the material allegations of the
complaint as being true and construe the complaint in favor of the
party seeking standing.130
In the event that the complaint's allegations of standing are
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, the defendant may
move for summary judgement pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 on the
grounds that there is no dispute as to material fact and that the
defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.13 1 When a
motion for summary judgment is made for lack of standing, the
party adverse to the motion must not rest upon the allegations of
the complaint, as with a motion to dismiss, but must set forth
specific facts that show a genuine issue of fact as to the plaintiff's
standing.1
32
Another procedural issue is whether an organization may
represent its members in a lawsuit and thereby constitute an
exception to the prudential limitation on third party standing.
3 3
The Supreme Court has held that an organization may sue for
128. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) provides: "Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action."
Id
129. Id.
130. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,501 (1975).
131. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides in part:
The judgement sought shal be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.
IdL
132. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides in part:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's
pleadings, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the
adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against the adverse party.
Id
133. See supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text (discussing prudential standing requirements
and third party standing).
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injuries to either itself'" or its members.135 However, as stated
by the Court in Sierra Club v. Morton, an organization's mere
interest and concern in environmental issues is not sufficient to
meet the injury requirement. '36 Instead, an organization must
meet the three part test introduced in Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Commission'37 in order to bring suit on behalf
of its members.' An association has standing to represent its
members when: (a) the members have standing to sue in their own
right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
purpose of the organization; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor
the requested relief require the participation of the individual
members. 139
II. BACKGROUND To THE FEDERAL LAND
POLICY MANAGEMENT ACT
The primary issue of substantive law in Lujan was whether the
Bureau of Land Management [hereinafter BLM], a subdivision of
the Department of the Interior, was in violation of federal law in
its administration of the Federal Land Policy Management Act
[hereinafter FLPMA or the Act]."4 Congress passed FLPMA in
19764 ' in an effort to eliminate the confusion regarding
management of public lands.142 In general, FLPMA establishes
134. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963).
135. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
136. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972).
137. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
138. Id. at 343.
139. Id.
140. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3182 (1990).
141. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1783 (1988).
142. Lujan, 110 S. CL at 3182. For much of the history of the United States, federal land policy
was designed to dispose of rather than manage public lands. Brief for Petitioners at 2, Lujan, 110 S.
CL 3177 (1990) (No. 89-640). Late in the nineteenth century and early in the twentieth century,
United States citizens were empowered by Congress through various statutes to acquire title and
rights in federally owned land. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3182. However, Congress also empowered the
President to remove public lands from the operation of the statutes and gave the President the right
to withdraw public lands from settlement, sale or entry and reserve the lands for various public
purposes. Id. In addition, the Secretary of the Interior was given authority to classify public lands as
either suitable for disposal or for federal retention and management. Id. President Franklin Roosevelt
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comprehensive rules for managing and preserving federal lands and
provides for protection of land in the public domain from private
ownership and development. 143 The Act repealed laws which
governed the disposal of federal public lands, and established a
policy of retaining such lands for multiple use management.'"
The Secretary of the Interior was directed by FLPMA to inventory
all public lands and their natural resource potential and to initiate
land use planning prior to any change in the use status of the
lands.'45 The existing land classifications146 were subject to the
land use planning process and the Secretary was empowered to
modify or terminate land classifications consistent with the
developed land use plans. 47
The Secretary was also authorized by FLPMA to "modify,
extend or revoke" any land withdrawals,'48 issued by the
Department of the Interior prior to the Act so that the land might
withdrew all unreserved public land from disposal until the land could be classified. Id. Congress
amended the Taylor Grazing Act in 1936 to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to review and
classify land withdrawn by Roosevelt's orders and then to open up the lands so classified as to allow
disposal of the land. Id. The land was not to be disposed of until classified and opened for entry. Id.
Under the various laws, management of public lands became chaotic. Id. Determining which lands
had been withdrawn and how much the withdrawals overlapped each other was difficult. Id. It was
also difficult to determine the purposes of the withdrawals and what public purposes were allowed.
Id. The Federal Land Policy Management Act was enacted by Congress as an attempt to resolve the
chaos within the government's system of managing federal lands. Id. at 3182-83.
143. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
144. Lujan, 110 S. CL at 3183. Under FLPMA § 103(c), 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (1988), "'multiple
use management" means, inter alia, "the management of the public lands and their various resource
values so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and future needs
of the American people." Id.
145. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (1988).
146. Land "classifications" is the name given to one of two major processes used by the
Department of the Interior for establishing and implementing land use planning for vast amounts of
federal lands. 43 U.S.C. § 315f (1988). The other name given to the processes is "withdrawals." See
infra note 148 (defining "withdrawal"). The Department of the Interioruses the classification process
to categorize lands for specific usage and to determine which of public lands administered by the
Department of the Interior should be retained in federal ownership and which are suitable for
disposal.
147. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3183.
148. Land "withdrawals" is the second of two major processes the Department of the Interior
uses for establishing and implementing land use planning of federal land. See supra note 146
(discussing land "classifications"). Withdrawals remove designated land otherwise in the public
domain and thereby exempt it from the application of federal disposal laws. 43 U.S.C. § 17020)
(1988).
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either be sold or returned to multiple use management.'49 The
Secretary was specifically directed by FLPMA to review the land
withdrawals already in existence in eleven western states and to
make recommendations to the President as to which lands should
remain withdrawn from disposition, settlement or occupation.150
Pursuant to FLPMA, BLM began reviewing thousands of
withdrawals and classifications affecting millions of acres of
federal lands and altering the designations of the land as deemed
necessary according to existing land use regulations.' 1' By 1986,
BLM had terminated classifications on approximately 160,000,000





In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,15 3 the respondent,
the National Wildlife Federation [hereinafter NWF], brought suit
against the Department of the Interior, the Secretary of the Interior,
and the Director of the BLM [hereinafter, collectively,
Government] alleging that the defendants had violated FLPMA, the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,1 4 and APA section
10(e). 155 The NWF deemed the Government's administration of
the FLPMA statutory requirements a single federal program which
149. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3183. Explicitly stated within FLPMA was a policy favoring the
retention of public lands for multiple use management. FLPMA § 102(a)(1), 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1)
(1988).
150. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3183.
151. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Lujan, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
152. Brief for Petitioners at 11, Lujan, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990) (No. 89-640).
153. 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
154. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982). In particular, NEPA 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) requires
Federal agencies to "include in every recommendation or report on ... major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible
official on ... the environmental impact of the proposed action." Id
155. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3184 ("[R]espondent alleged that all of the . . . actions were
'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law' and should
therefore be set aside pursuant to § 10(e) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706.").
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the NWF designated the "Land Withdrawal Review Program.' 15
6
In question were approximately 1,250 classification changes and
withdrawal revocations"5 7 affecting approximately 180 million
acres of federal land.'58 NWF sought to enjoin all 1,250
classification changes made by the BLM on the basis that
implementing the Land Withdrawal Review Program was a single
agency action which was in violation of federal law. 159 NWF
claimed that the Government failed to follow the land use planning
process as provided by FLPMA in making the land status
decisions."60 Further allegations within the complaint included
charges that land uses considered by the Government focused
inordinately on mineral exploitation and development161 and that
the Government failed to provide public notice of the withdrawal
and classification decisions and thereby prevented opportunities for
public participation.162
In general, the NWF averred that the illegal acts of the
government in reclassifying withdrawn lands and returning other
lands to the public domain would subject the lands to mining
activities and destroy their natural beauty. 63 NWF maintained
that this action by the government constituted an injury-in-fact to
NWF members who used lands which would be affected by the
156. Lujan, 110 S. CL at 3183. The Government disputed that the Land Withdrawal Review
Program was a *'program" and instead referred to it within their Supreme Court brief as "'hundreds
of executive branch decisions." Brief for Respondent at 2, n.1, Lujan, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990) (No.
89-640).
157. Lujan, 110 S. CL at 3189.
158. Brief for Respondent at 2, Lujan, 110 S. CL 3177 (1990) (No. 89-640).
159. Lujan, 110 S. CL at 3183-84.
160. Id. 43 U.S.C § 1701(a)(2) (1988) provides that: 'Mhe national interest will best be
realized if the public lands and their resources are periodically and systematically inventoried and
their present and future use is projected through a land use planning process." Id. Section 202 of
FLPMA specifically requires that land use plans "shall be developed for the public lands regardless
of whether such lands previously have been classified, withdrawn, set aside, or otherwise designated
for one or more uses." 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (1988). Governmental regulations define the land use
plans required under FLPMA as Resource Management Plans. 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(k) (1989). The
Government had completed only nine of more than 100 required Resource Management Plans at the
time the lawsuit was filed. Brief for Respondent at 6, Lujan, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990) (No. 89-640).
161. Lujan, I10 S. Ct. at 3184.
162. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(5), 1712(c)(9),
1712(0, and 1739(e) (1988). Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3184.
163. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3183-84.
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land withdrawal review program.' NWF therefore sought to
enjoin the Government from continuing implementation of the
program. 65 The NWF appended to its complaint a list of 814
land status actions taken by the Government pursuant to the
challenged program to identify the particular agency actions which
were the subject of the NWF complaint.1"
Because neither FLPMA nor NEPA contain citizen suit
provisions, 67 NWF claimed a right to judicial review pursuant to
section 702.68 Therefore, to establish standing to bring the suit,
NWF had to show that the elements of constitutional standing were
present and also that the prudential zone of interests requirement
of section 702 was met.169 NWF sought to meet these
requirements by claiming that its members had suffered an injury-
in-fact traceable to the government's actions and redressable by the
court, and also that the relevant statute, FLPMA, contemplated
protecting the interests the NWF claimed were threatened.
1 70
In addition, because NWF sought to represent its members,
NWF had to meet the test of Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Commission171 to establish the standing of an
organization to represent its members. 72 This test requires a
showing that the members had standing to sue in their own right,
that the interests sought to be protected by the organization are
germane to the purpose of the organization, and that the action
does not require the participation of the individual members.
173
In support of its standing claim, NWF submitted affidavits of two
164. Id. at 3184.
165. Id.
166. Brief for Petitioner at 12, Lujan, 110 S. CL 3177 (1990) (No. 89-640).
167. See supra notes 109-125 and accompanying text (discussing citizen suit provisions of
environmental statutes).
168. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3185. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (stating text of §
702).
169. See supra notes 101-108 and accompanying text (discussing standing requirements of §
702).
170. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3184.
171. 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
172. Lujan, 110 S. CL at 3187.
173. See supra notes 133-139 and accompanying text (describing the three part test from Hunt
to ascertain whether an organization has standing to represent its members).
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of its members which claimed that the members' recreational use
and aesthetic enjoyment of the federal lands would be and had
already been adversely affected by the Government's opening up
the land for natural resource development without compliance with
applicable laws.'74 These affidavits became critical to NWF's
claim of standing because, without a claim of injury-in-fact to the
interest of a member, NWF would be in the same position as the
plaintiff in Sierra Club v. Morton75 and would suffer a dismissal
for failing to allege an actual injury.17
The two affidavits submitted by NWF claimed that the affiants
used land "in the vicinity" of land affected by two of the
government actions listed in the appendix.'" One of these, an
affidavit sworn to by Peggy Kay Peterson claimed that she used
land "in the vicinity" of the South Pass-Green Mountain area of
Wyoming for recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment which
would be adversely affected as a result of the Government's
actions, thereby injuring her interests.178 The specific government
action, to which Peterson's affidavit referred, opened up an area of
approximately 4,500 acres for mining within the two million acre
parcel addressed by the BLM's classification change. 79 Initially
174. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187. The affidavits of the two members were submitted after the
preliminary injunction was issued. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 313 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
175. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
176. See supra notes 36-53 and accompanying text (discussing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972), and the injury requirement).
177. Lujan, 110 S. C. at 3184. The two member affidavits submitted by the NWF were
substantially the same and the analysis applied by the Court was identical in each case. Id. at 3187-
88. This Note, in the interest of brevity, will only discuss the affidavit sworn to by Peggy Kay
Peterson. The second affidavit, sworn to by Richard Erman, only differed from Peterson's in that the
land claimed to be used by Erman was "in the vicinity of Grand Canyon National Park, the Arizona
Strip (Kanab Plateau), and the Kaibab National Forest." Id. at 3187. In addition to these two member
affidavits, which were submitted to establish NWF's representational standing, NWF also submitted
an affidavit from one of its vice-presidents. He claimed that NWF had standing in its own right
because the complaint alleged that the Government failed to publish regulations, invite public
participation, and to perform an environmental impact statement with respect to the Land Withdrawal
Review Program as a whole. Id. NWF claimed injury from these actions by the Government because
it prevented NWF from informing its members and the general public about "conservation issues"
and thereby prevented NWF from fulfilling its mission. Id. at 3194.
178. Id. at 3187.
179. Id. at 3188.
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te BLM had withdrawn the two million acre parcel from
appropriation under agricultural land laws and from sales.180
-owever, with the exception of 2,000 acres which were to remain
closed, the balance of the parcel had already been open for mineral
leasing and mining under the classification in effect prior to the
change.
18 1
The district court granted NWF's motion for a preliminary
injunction which prohibited any modification or termination in
classification of the 180,000,000 acres of public land affected by
tie Land Withdrawal Review Program." 2 The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the granting of the
injunction."13 Upon remand, the district court granted the
Government's motion for summary judgment for NWF's lack of
standing on the basis that the initial affidavits were not specific
enough.'" In particular, the district court found that Peterson's
affidavit failed to allege that her use and enjoyment extended to the
particular 4,500 acres being reclassified by the government action
but instead merely claimed that she used land "in the
vicinity. 18 5 The Court of Appeals reversed the district court,
holding that the Peterson affidavit was sufficient to support NWF's
standing claim."6
180. Brief for Petitioners at 8, Lujan, 110 S. CL 3177 (1990) (No. 89-640).
181. Lujan, 110 .l  at 3188.
182. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985). The district court
said it had "no problem in holding that defendants' actions in lifting protective land restrictions will
irreparably injure plaintiff's members unless enjoined." Id. at 278. The court also believed it was
likely that NWF would succeed on the merits. Id. The only standing issue raised at this point of the
proceedings was whether NWF lacked standing regarding its claim that the Government violated
FLPMA by failing to submit recommendations to the President and Congress. Id. at 277. The district
court found that the standing issue was moot because, as part of the same opinion, it had allowed a
congressman to intervene as a plaintiff and the congressman was found to have standing. Id. at
274-75, 277. The congressman withdrew his separate appeal after the 1989 unanimous Court of
Appeals ruling that NWF had standing. Brief for Respondent at 6 n.7, Lujan, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990)
(No. 89-640).
183. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
184. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 332 (D.D.C. 1989).
185. Lujan, 110 S. Ct at 3188.
186. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422,432-33 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Because the
Court of Appeals found the Peterson affidavit to adequately support NWF's assertion of standing, it
did not decide whether the Erman or Greenwalt affidavits were specific enough to merit standing.
Id. at 431 n.13. See supra note 176 (detailing the Erman and Greenwalt affidavits). The Court of
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B. The Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court, in a five to four decision
87
written by Justice Scalia, reversed the Court of Appeals and
affirmed the District Court's summary judgment for the
Government. 8 Because the case came to the Supreme Court on
the Government's motion for summary judgment, the majority
identified the proper standard of review to be the standard
applicable to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."8 9
Thus, the Government's motion for summary judgment would be
denied if a material issue of fact was evident from the papers
before the Court.1
The first question considered by the majority was whether the
NWF had representational standing to bring the suit on behalf of
its members according to the standard set forth in Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Commission.19' The majority
found that the interests sought to be protected in this case,
recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of public lands, were
sufficiently related to the purposes of the NWF and that the
organization met the requirements of section 702 for standing if
Peterson did."9 The focus of the opinion therefore shifted to the
issue of whether Peterson met the standing requirements of section
702.
The majority's next consideration was whether the specific facts
alleged in the affidavits raised any genuine issue of fact as to
whether the injury claimed by the affiants was the result of an
agency action1 93 as required under section 702.194 In effect the
Appeals also held that it was an abuse of discretion of the district court not to consider four
additional affidavits alleging injuries incurred by NWF members submitted after argument on the
motion for summary judgment National Wildlife Fedn v. Burford, 878 F.2d at 433.
187. See supra note 8 (detailing how each justice ruled).
188. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3194.
189. Id. at 3186.
190. Id.
191. 432 U.S. 333 (1977). See supra notes 133-139 and accompanying text (detailing the test
to be applied for representational standing).
192. Lujan, 110 S. CL at 3187.
193. See infra note 101 (defining "'agency action").
194. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187.
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majority was analyzing whether the alleged injury was traceable to
the complained of act." 5 The majority found that the Peterson
affidavit, when considered in conjunction with the listing of 814
BLM land status decisions appended to the complaint, was
sufficiently particular regarding the agency action which was the
subject of the complaint.1" The geographical description provided
in Peterson's affidavit agreed with the description of the two
million acre parcel addressed by BLM order W-6228, which was
one of the BLM orders referenced in the attachment to the
complaint.197 The parties agreed that BLM order W-6228 was the
subject of Peterson's affidavit and therefore the majority found that
the particular agency action complained of was ascertainable.
19 8
The majority also found that the prudential requirement of
section 702, that the injury be within the "zone of interests" of the
statute underlying the complaint, was met by Peterson.'" The
majority reasoned that if Peterson's recreational and aesthetic
enjoyment were adversely affected from mining activities resulting
from the BLM's reclassification of the parcel, such injuries would
meet the zone of interests requirement.2" The majority had no
doubt that harm to recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment were
among the sorts of interests that Congress designed FLPMA and
NEPA to protect.
2 1
The only remaining issue, according to the majority, was
whether the facts alleged in the affidavits showed that the
recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of Peterson were adversely
affected or aggrieved.2 2 In essence, the case was reduced to the
195. See supra notes 61-79 and accompanying text (discussing the traceability element of
standing).
196. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187. The attachment to the complaint, a listing of 788 [Petitioner's
Brief, at 12, alleged 814 decisions] decisions by the Government pursuant to the Land Withdrawal
Review Program, included a reference to a Government decision corresponding to the general area
described by Peterson which terminated the withdrawal classification ofsome 4,500 acres in that area.
Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187.
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question of whether the affidavits supported the existence of an
injury-in-fact sufficient to find the irreducible minimum required
for constitutional standing." 3
The majority held that the affidavits submitted by NWF were
inadequate to show the requisite injury-in-fact because Peterson's
affidavit contained no allegation that her use and enjoyment
extended to the particular 4,500 acres affected by the Government's
action."' Her affidavit, on its face, only contained a bare
allegation of injury and failed to express any specific facts to
support her allegations. 5 The majority therefore affirmed the
District Court's decision to grant the Government's motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that the papers before the Court
failed to establish that there existed a material issue of fact
regarding whether Peterson suffered an injury-in-fact from the
reclassification of the two million acre parcel. 2"
The majority explained that it was overruling the Court of
Appeals because the lower court erred in its application of the
summary judgment standard.0 7 The Court of Appeals, in finding
that Peterson had alleged sufficient facts to support her claim of
injury, reasoned that if Peterson's affidavit was not referring to the
4,500 acres which would be opened up for mining under the BLM
reclassification, her allegations were meaningless or perjurious. 20
Peterson's affidavit, according to that court, was, at a minimum,
ambiguous regarding whether the 4,500 acres was the same land
she used for recreational purposes and aesthetic enjoyment. 9
Thus, the Court of Appeals reasoned that since any factual
ambiguity on a motion for summary judgment must be resolved in
203. See supra note 103 ("adversely affected or aggrieved" under § 702 encompasses "'injury-
in-fact.") The Court of Appeals specifically said the district court rested its denial of standing on
NWF's failure to demonstrate the requisite injury-in-fact. National Wildlife Fedn v. Burford, 878
F.2d 422, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
204. Lujan, II0 S. Ct at 3187-88.
205. ld. at 3188.
206. Id. at 3189.
207. Id. at 3188. See supra notes 131-132 and accompanying text (discussing the summary
judgment standard).
208. Lujan, 110 S. CL at 3188.
209. Id.
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favor of the non-moving party21 and, since it was possible that
Peterson did use the 4,500 acres, there was enough detail in
support of standing to raise material issues of fact sufficient to
require a trial on the merits.2"
The majority disagreed.2"2 In ruling upon a motion for
summary judgment a district court is to resolve issues of factual
dispute in favor of the non-moving party when the facts
specifically alleged by the non-moving party are contradicted by
facts specifically alleged by the moving party.213 However, in this
case, NWF merely replaced the conclusory allegations within its
complaint with the conclusory allegations of Peterson's
affidavit.214 The fact that if Peterson's allegations were untrue she
would have perjured herself was not sufficient to create a genuine
issue for trial, because on a motion for summary judgment the non-
moving party must provide probative evidence to support the
complaint.21
The National Wildlife Federation argued that its standing in this
case was less complicated than that in SCRAP where the Court
found that the plaintiff organization had standing.216 In SCRAP,
the plaintiffs' standing was based upon allegations that the
plaintiffs use of natural resources widely scattered around the
Washington metropolitan area would be harmed by pollution
210. Id.
211. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422,430 (D.C. Cir. 1989). As an alternative
basis for reaching the same conclusion regarding the motion for summary judgment, the Court of
Appeals pointed out that the Peterson and Erman affidavits had already been found, in the court's
earlier opinion of National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 835 F.2d at 329-30, to provide adequate
grounds for NWF to establish irreparable harm when the court was considering whether a preliminary
injunction had been properly issued. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d at 432. The Court
of Appeals said that not only had NWF demonstrated specific harm, but, as also required for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction, they had carried the burden of persuasion showing a likelihood
of success on the merits. Id. Therefore the Court of Appeals reasoned that if the affidavits were
specific enough to obtain a preliminary injunction, they were also specific enough to withstand a
motion for summary judgment. Id.
212. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3188.
213. Id.
214. Id. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) requires that, upon a motion for summary judgment, the non-
moving party provide affidavits or other evidence to "set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial." Id. See supra note 132 (providing text of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
215. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3188.
216. Brief for Respondent at 37, Lujan, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990) (No. 89-640).
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resulting from higher freight rates." 7 However, the majority
found that this case was distinguishable from SCRAP because that
case was before the Court on a motion to dismiss rather than on a
motion for summary judgment.218 A motion to dismiss, pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), presumes that the allegations of the
complaint embrace specific facts necessary to support the claim; a
summary judgment motion, however, does not.219 Therefore, the
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the
granting of the Government's motion for summary judgment by the
district court.
220
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Blackmun's dissent maintained that the Peterson
affidavit, in conjunction with other evidence in the record, was
sufficient to at least establish a material issue of fact regarding the
existence of an injury-in-fact. 22' The record itself provided
abundant evidence that the Government's actions would lead to an
increase in mining activity on federal lands and such mining would
result in environmental damage sufficient to constitute the requisite
injury.' The issue therefore, according to Justice Blackmun, was
whether Peterson had identified with sufficient precision the
particular locations where she had suffered her injuries.2 While
admitting that her affidavit could have been drafted more precisely,
the dissent maintained that Peterson's allegations, in the context of
the record as a whole, were adequate to defeat a motion for
summary judgment.224 The dissent pointed out that the affidavits
217. Id. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (discussing the SCRAP case).
218. Lujan, 110 S. Ct at 3189.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 3194. The Court also held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court
to refuse to consider, for standing purposes, four additional affidavits submitted following argument
on the summary judgment motion. Id. at 3189-93. In addition, the Court held than an affidavit
submitted to establish an independent right of the NWF to judicial review was insufficient because
it failed to specify facts necessary to survive a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 3194.
221. Id. at 3195 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 3194-95 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 3195 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 3195-96 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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were at least sufficient in describing the location to enable the
government to identify the particular reclassification decisions
referred to by the affiants.
225
Justice Blackmun made it clear that he believed it was not
necessary that the land Peterson recreated on was even within the
precise 4,500 acres that was affected by the reclassification
decision. 6 He was willing to allow that harm could result to her
use and enjoyment of the federal lands in the vicinity of those
directly impacted by the Government's decision.2 7 He noted that
the areas harmed by mining and related activities could extend
beyond the precise location where the mining occurred.2"
In addition, Peterson's affidavit not only alleged a threat of
future harm, but also alleged that her use and enjoyment of the
federal lands had already been adversely affected by the agency
action.' M Peterson was therefore not only speculating that her
recreational and aesthetic interests would be harmed in the future
by mining activity resulting from the BLM reclassification, but she
was specifically alleging that the harm had already occurred
resulting in her injury."0 Therefore, as stated by the Court of
Appeals, Peterson's allegations were either meaningless or
225. Id. at 3196 (Blackmun, L, dissenting).
226. Id. Peterson's affidavit alleged that she used federal land "in the vicinity of South Pass-
Green Mountain, Wyoming." Id. The dissent pointed out that the Government itself had repeatedly
referred to the "South Pass-Green Mountain area" in its description of the region opened up for
mining activity. Id. Therefore, in the context of the record as a whole, there was sufficient evidence
that the lands claimed to be used by Peterson would be adversely impacted by the decision to at least
create an issue of fact to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 3196, n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Brief for Respondent at 30-31, Lujan, 110
S. Ct. 3177 (1990) (No. 89-640), went into considerable detail regarding this point:
[Tihe harm that comes from mining - whether it be for oil, gas, uranium, silver, gold, copper,
zinc or agate - is not localized. Landscapes are obscured for great distances; fugitive dust is
created and goes where the wind goes; contaminated water flows for miles; blasting violates
noise levels, causes wildlife to move, and affects wildlife mating habits over great distances;
and cyanide poured over heap leach piles after strip-mining kills fish far downstream. So even
if Peterson's affidavit were interpreted to aver injury-in-fact to a person recreating in the
"vicinity" of lands being opened to desecration, that would be entirely appropriate.
Id.
229. Lujan, 110 S. CL at 3196 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Prior to the district court's issuance
of the preliminary injunction, 406 mining claims had been staked for the South Pass-Green Mountain
area. Id. at 3195 n.l.
230. Brief for Respondent at 32, Lujan, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990) (No. 89-640).
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perjurious if the lands she was referring to were not those harmed
pursuant to the questioned termination order.31
The dissent therefore concluded that the affidavits were
sufficient to establish NWF's standing to bring the lawsuit and
survive the motion for summary judgment. 2 In addition, the
dissent concluded that the district court abused its discretion in
refusing to consider the additional affidavits submitted by NWF
after the hearing regarding the summary judgment motion.3 3
IV. LEGAL RAMIFCATIONS
A. Method of Reviewing Evidence Within the Record
The majority and dissenting opinions in Lujan illustrate two
different procedural views of members of the Court regarding how
evidence should be reviewed when ruling on motions for summary
judgment. The majority opinion refused to draw any inferences
from the facts set forth in the record in determining whether there
was a factual issue for trial.' Although the majority recognized
that factual issues in controversy are to be resolved in favor of the
non-moving party, it would not presume any missing facts
necessary to create the controversy. 235 The dissenting opinion, in
contrast, stated the principle that the inferences drawn from the
underlying facts contained within evidentiary materials were to be
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
2 36
The majority opinion found, in applying its view of the
summary judgment standard, that the Peterson affidavit was
inadequate because she had only claimed to use land "in the
vicinity" of a 2,000,000 acre parcel addressed by a BLM land
classification decision, but of which only 4,500 acres would
231. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3196 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 3194 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
233. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 3188-89.
235. Id.
236. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3196 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Diebold,
Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).
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actually be opened to mining by the BLM action.27 There was
no showing that Peterson's use extended to the particular 4,500
acres being opened for mininge'2 and therefore the affidavit
alleged only an injury without specifying that the injury would
occur at the location which was the subject of the classification
change. "9 However, according to the Government's evidence,
with the exception of 2,000 acres which were to remain closed
under the change in classification and the 4500 acres which were
opened to mining by the BLM decision, the balance of the
2,000,000 acre parcel had already been open for mineral leasing
and mining at the time of the reclassification.2" By combining
the Government's evidence with Peterson's allegation that her
injury was the opening up of the lands for mining, it is clear that
Peterson's affidavit could only have been referring to the 4,500
acres affected by the decision.24 Although the majority stated
that it was unwilling to presume the missing facts necessary to
create the controversy, 242 all that was required in this case was to
take a very small step in logic. Peterson claimed that opening up
an area to mining within a two million acre parcel would injure her
interests. Only 6,500 acres out of the total of two million acres
hadn't been opened up for mining. The complained of government
action was opening up 4,500 acres out of the 6,500 to mining.
Therefore, although Peterson didn't expressly state she used the
4,500 acres subject to the classification change, no other reasonable
conclusion is apparent from the record.243
237. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187-88.
238. Id. at 3188.
239. Id. at 3187-98.
240. Brief for Respondent at 28, Lujan, 110 S. C. 3177 (1990) (No. 89-640).
241. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3188; Brief for Respondent at 28, Lujan, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990) (No.
89-640).
242. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189.
243. The respondent made the argument which is presented here. Brief for Respondent at 28,
Lujan, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990) (No. 89-640). Perhaps what weakened NWF's argument was that an
alternative basis for finding injury to Peterson's interests was presented which didn't require the
conclusion that Peterson's affidavit referred to the 4,500 acres opened to mining. Id. at 30-31. The
Brief acknowledged that as an alternative basis for finding Peterson had suffered injury, the Court
could look to the fact that harm from mining wasn't localized and that being in the vicinity of land
opened to mining would suffice. Id. The admission that Peterson's affidavit could have an alternative
meaning would seem to support the Government's claim that the affidavit wasn't specific enough.
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In contrast, the dissent repeatedly stated its willingness, when
ruling upon a motion for summary judgment, to draw inferences
favorable to the opponent of the motion in light of all of the
evidence within the record.2" It was not necessary to presume
facts in this case, but only to view particular assertions within the
affidavit in the light of all of the evidence before the Court.245
The dissent therefore would have held that the Peterson affidavit
was sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment.
246
The majority viewpoint provides warning that affidavits
submitted in opposition to motions for summary judgment should
not rely upon any inferences to be drawn from the evidence in the
record, but should expressly state all of the logical connections
between the facts which the party opposed to the motion wishes the
court to consider in making its decision.
B. Has Lujan Changed Constitutional Standing?
Perhaps the most intriguing question regarding standing from
Lujan is whether the Court has introduced a new requirement in
evaluating whether a plaintiff has suffered an injury-in-fact.
2 47
The Court in Sierra Club v. Morton248 articulated the requirement
that the party seeking judicial review must be among the injured so
as to have a personal stake in the controversy.249 Will the Court
244. See, e.g., Lujan at 3196 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("In light of the principle that '[oln
summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in [evidentiary]
materials must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.') (quoting
United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)) (brackets in original)); id. at 3194
(Blackanun, J., dissenting) ("the affidavits... in conjunction with other record evidence ... were
sufficient to establish the standing ... to bring this suit."); id. at 3195-96 (Blackmnun, J., dissenting)
("the allegations contained in the . . . affidavits, in the context of the record as a whole, were
adequate to defeat a motion for summary judgment."); and id. at 3196 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("To read particular assertions within the affidavit, in light of the document as a whole is ... 'a
world apart' from 'presuming' facts that are neither stated nor implied.").
245. Id. at 3196 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
246. Id.
247. See supra notes 36-60 and accompanying text (discussing the injury-in-fact requirement
of constitutional standing).
248. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
249. Id. at 740. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text (reviewing Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)).
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now require the plaintiff to not only be among the injured, but that
the location at which the injury is claimed correspond to the
location of the act which is the subject of the complaint?250 The
Court did not make it clear whether the basis of its ruling was that
the affidavit failed to allege that the injury occurred within the
specific area opened to mining by the BLM decision, or if the basis
was Peterson's failure to specifically allege how the reclassification
would injure her recreational use of land in the vicinity of the
4,500 acres being opened to mining.
The question therefore arises as to what the Peterson affidavit
could have alleged which would suffice for NWF to survive the
motion for summary judgment. Suppose Peterson had alleged that
although the land she used was not opened to mining by the
classification change, the land would nonetheless be adversely
affected by mining activities on the 4,500 acres, and she provided
detail as to how the land and her interests in it would be harmed.
Assuming Peterson had made such allegations, if NWF would still
not survive the motion for summary judgment, then the Court
would have added to injury-in-fact a requirement that the location
at which the injury is claimed coincide with the location of the
complained-of act.
The dissenting opinion suggests that the majority's decision was
based not on Peterson's failure to allege that the injury occurred
within the specific area opened to mining by the BLM decision, but
that she did not specifically allege how the reclassification would
injure her recreational use of land in the vicinity of the 4,500 acres
250. The district court in National Wildlfe Federation v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C.
1988), would seem to support making such an argument. Id. at 331. In making its decision, the
district court cited guidelines from Wilderness Society v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. at 331. Remarking that National Wildlife Federation
v. Burford was similar to Wilderness Society because both cases concerned conduct of a third party -
developers - whose possible response to government action would injure the plaintiffs, the district
court quoted Wilderness Society:
Where the alleged injury involves access to land in a three party case ... the judgment
regarding the likelihood of injury turns on whether the plantiffsfuture conduct will occur
in the same location as the third party's response to the challenged governmental action.
Otherwise, the threat of injury would be too amorphous or uncertain.
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Bu.ford, 699 F. Supp. at 331 [emphasis in original] (quoting Wilderness
Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
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being opened to mining. Rather than basing his argument entirely
on the theory that the Peterson affidavit could only be referring to
the 4,500 acres being reclassified, Justice Blackmun looked to the
ways Peterson's interests could have been injured without her
recreational activities taking place directly within that parcel.25 '
The dissent pointed out that the harm caused by mining and its
related activities extends beyond the precise location where the
mining occurs and therefore the opinion argued that it was not
necessary that the land Peterson recreated on be within the precise
4,500 acres opened to mining by the reclassification decision. 2
The Supreme Court Brief submitted by NWF in Lujan argued
that the Supreme Court had no previous difficulty in construing
phrases such as "in the vicinity of" to suffice in establishing a
plaintiff's standing." 3 Indeed, in suits brought under the citizen
suit provisions to enforce compliance with the Clean Air Act" 4
or the Clean Water Act-5 a requirement that the alleged harm
constituting the injury-in-fact literally occur in the same location as
the alleged wrongful act would lead to absurd results--the plaintiffs
would only have standing if they derived their recreational and
aesthetic benefits immediately next to the exhaust stack or drain
pipe discharging the illegal pollutants. Such an interpretation would
render the citizen suit provisions of those Acts worthless and would
be directly contrary to the legislative intent of the Acts. Therefore,
the understanding of the Lujan dissent as to the basis of the
251. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3196 (Blackman, J., dissenting). But see supra note 243 and
accompanying text (explaining how presenting an alternative explanation of how Peterson could be
injured could have weakened NWF's case).
252. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3196, n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra note 228 (detailing
how harm from mining is not necessarily limited to a confined area).
253. Brief for Respondent at 31, Lujan, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990) (No.89-640). The Brief cited
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), as an example.
Brief for Respondent at 32. In Duke, 40 individuals living "in close proximity" to a proposed
nuclear power plant sight were found to have standing to challenge construction of the plant. Duke
Power, 438 U.S. at 73-74.
254. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988).
255. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988).
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majority's decision, the legislative intent of environmental
statutes," 6 and Supreme Court precedent all argue against the
proposition that the Court intended in Lujan to modify the injury-
in-fact requirement by adopting a standard that the location of the
injury literally coincide with the location of the complained-of act.
The conclusion must therefore be made that the rationale for
the Court's decision in Lujan was simply that the affidavits were
not specific enough regarding the location where Peterson was
injured, the nature of her injuries and how those injuries were
traceable to the Government's actions. Therefore, Lujan serves to
warn all plaintiffs, in cases where standing is a possible issue, to
be painfully specific in affidavits provided to the court in response
to a motion for summary judgment. As a corollary, it suggests that
defendants might, as a defensive ploy, move for summary judgment
whenever lack of standing is a colorable issue.
C. Is Lujan a Retreat from SCRAP?
Perhaps the most chilling aspect of Lujan to future
environmental plaintiffs is whether the case signals a retreat by the
Court from the permissive approach of SCRAP. In SCRAP the
plaintiffs claimed they would be harmed from increased pollution
at resources surrounding the Washington Metropolitan area enjoyed
by the plaintiffs which would result from higher freight rates for
recycled materials. 7 The NWF had argued that if the claimed
harm in SCRAP was sufficient to establish injury-in-fact and meet
the requirements for standing, then certainly Peterson had alleged
facts sufficient to demonstrate a specific and concrete injury as
well.2"' Peterson swore within her affidavit that the land she used
256. This argument assumes that the parameters for determining whether someone is "adversely
affected or aggrieved" under section 702 are the same as for determining injury-in-fact as required
for thde citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. As commented in note
103, supra, the Supreme Court has stated that the "adversely affected or aggrieved" requirement of
§ 702 is not to be interpreted more restrictively than injury-in-fact.
257. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (describing the facts and holding from
SCRAP).
258. Brief for Respondent at 37, Lujan, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990) (89-640).
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for recreational and aesthetic enjoyment was threatened by opening
it up for mineral leasing."'
The majority brusquely dismissed NWF's reliance on
SCRAP.260 The analogy was not appropriate, wrote Justice Scalia,
because SCRAP involved a motion to dismiss on the pleadings and
not a motion for summary judgment as did Lujan.26 t Therefore,
SCRAP was of no relevance in determining whether Peterson's
claims were specific enough to support her claim of injury.262
However, the opinion did not stop with merely distinguishing
the procedural settings of SCRAP and Lujan. In dicta, Justice Scalia
wrote that the "expansive" approach of SCRAP had never since
been repeated by the Court.263  Apparently the "expansive
approach" he was referring to in SCRAP was the granting of
judicial review in an environmental case where the plaintiffs'
claimed injury-in-fact was grounded upon a flimsy chain of
causation, which consisted of linking railroad rate hikes with
increased pollution at natural resources enjoyed by the
plaintiffs.2" Does Lujan therefore signal a retreat by the Court
from the permissive approach of SCRAP? The answer is "maybe."
Justice Scalia was, arguably, simply stating a fact when he
wrote that SCRAP had not since been emulated by the Court. The
plaintiffs in SCRAP, as did those in Lujan, based their claim of
judicial review upon the provisions of section 10(a) of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. section 702.26 With the
259. Id.
260. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189. Justice Scalia wrote:
Respondent places great reliance, as did the Court of Appeals, upon our decision in
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) ... The
SCRAP opinion, whose expansive expression of what would suffice for § 702 review
under its particular facts has never since been emulated by this Court, is of no relevance
here, since it involved not a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment but a Rule 12(b)





264. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding of
SCRAP).
265. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S.
669, 685 (1973).
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Pacific Law Journal/ VoL 23
enactment of statutory provisions for citizen enforcement of
enveironmental acts following the SCRAP decision, the opportunities
for the Court to apply SCRAP's "expansive expression" of what
suffices for standing under section 702 have undoubtedly been
diminished.2" If plaintiffs have a choice between the specific
citizen suit provisions under the environmental statutes and the
general review provisions under section 702 they will undoubtedly
choose to proceed under the specific environmental statute. The
standing requirements under some of the Acts extend to the limits
allowed under article I without imposing any prudential
limitations.267 In contrast, when a party alleges standing pursuant
to section 702 an additional determination by a court as to whether
the interest which the plaintiff is seeking to protect is within the
"zone of interests" to be protected or regulated by the underlying
statute is required.268 In addition, many of 'the environmental
statutes provide for the recovery of attorney fees, which is not
addressed within section 702.269 Even if Justice Scalia's
comment is viewed as critical of SCRAP's liberal approach to the
injury-in-fact requirement, it doesn't state anything of monumental
novelty concerning SCRAP. Prior to Lujan, the SCRAP opinion had
already been recognized as an exceptional case because of the
attenuation between the act complained of and the claimed
injury.270 SCRAP has been criticized as being irreconcilable with
other major pronouncements of the Court on standing.27' Given
266. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (listing the environmental statutes which
contain citizen suit provisions).
267. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988).
268. Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1969).
269. See supra note 123 (detailing citizen suit provisions within environmental statutes which
contain provisions for recovery of attorney fees).
270. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717 (1990). In that case, which was decided
before Lujan, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote '[p]robably the most attenuated injury conferring article
III standing was that asserted by the respondents in United States v. SCRAP." Id. at 1725. Later in
the opinion, the Chief Justice wrote that SCRAP "surely went to the very outer limit of the law."
Id. See also DAvis, supra note 7, at 322.
271. DAvis, supra note 7, at 323. The author states that SCRAP is -technically irreconcilable"
with Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); and
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976). Id. In those three cases
the Court denied standing.
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the unpredictable nature of the Court's past decisions on the
subject, it seems likely that SCRAP was merely a highwater mark
for standing to which the Court isn't likely to return to soon.272
Therefore, in a sense, the dicta within Lujan concerning SCRAP
may signal a retreat from SCRAP's liberal injury-in-fact
requirement, but that signal has already been given in previous
opinions and Lujan apparently adds nothing new to the alarm.
V. CONCLUSION
In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation273 the United States
Supreme Court required that, to survive summary judgment, the
plaintiff must specify the precise basis of the plaintiff's standing to
challenge agency action.274 The Court will not draw inferences
from facts stated within the record on a motion for summary
judgment in determining whether the party opposing the motion has
established an issue as to a material fact.275 The plaintiff failed
to meet its burden of showing the existence of a material issue of
fact in Lujan because the affiants only alleged the use of lands in
the vicinity of those specifically affected by the defendants'
actions.
The majority in Lujan did not specify whether the affidavits
presented by the plaintiff were deficient because they failed to
specify how the agency action would adversely affect the affiants'
interests or that they were deficient because the affidavits failed to
allege that the location at which the injury was claimed
corresponded to the location of the act which was the subject of the
complaint. If the latter reason was the Court's grounds for finding
272. See generally DAvis, supra note 7, 208-348 (providing a critical view of the Court's
standing decisions). In his preliminary overview Professor Davis writes that '[t]he main failure of
the law of standing is neither that the judicial doors are in general open too much nor that they are
opened too little; the main failure is the inconsistency, unreliability, and inordinate complexity." Id.
at 208.
273. 110 S. CL 3177 (1990).
274. See supra notes 203-219 and accompanying text (discussing how the plaintiff failed to
sufficiently specify the basis for standing).
275. See supra notes 234-246 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's refusal to draw
inferences from the record in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment).
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the affidavits deficient, then Lujan has changed the constitutional
standing requirement of injury-in-fact. 276 However, because
constitutional standing requirements apply in all cases, requiring
direct correspondence between the location of the complained of
act and the injury would defy the legislative intent of various
citizen suit provisions of environmental statutes and would be
contrary to Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, the argument that
Lujan changes constitutional standing requirements for injury-in-
fact should be rejected. Instead Lujan should be read as further
explanation of the specificity required to withstand a motion for
summary judgment.
Lujan might also be interpreted as an indication that the Court
is retreating from the apparent liberal standing requirements
allowed for environmental plaintiffs in United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP).
2 77
However, Lujan is distinguishable from SCRAP because SCRAP is
limited to motions to dismiss. In addition, SCRAP represents a
highwater mark as far as the allowance of standing is concerned,
to which the Court is unlikely to return to soon.
The Lujan decision does illustrate however, by a split Supreme
Court reversing a unanimous Court of Appeals, the uncertainty
within federal courts in determining whether a plaintiff is properly
before the court. Because the Court failed to fully explain the
rationale for its decision, Lujan provides no further insight
regarding application of the standing doctrine. Faced with such
uncertainty, particularly when responding to a motion for summary
judgment, environmental plaintiffs should take care to specify as
precisely as possible the nature of the injury-in-fact, how the injury
is traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and how a
favorable decision from the court will redress the harm.
James M. Duncan
276. See supra notes 247-256 and accompanying text (discussing whether Lujan has changed
constitutional standing).
277. See supra notes 257-272 and accompanying text (discussing whether Lujan marks a retreat
from SCRAP).
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